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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH, in the interest
of EVERETT DON TOH, DARLA JANAE
PIKYAVIT, and JOEL REED PIKYAVIT,:

Case No. 14273

Mr. and Mrs. EARL BAKER,
Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellants, Mr. and Mrs. Earl Baker, appeal
from a decision of the Third District Juvenile Court, in
and for Juab County, State of Utah, depriving them of the
temporary custody, care and control of the above named
children and awarding the temporary custody, care and control
of said children to Mr.

Delton Tom.

DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT
In February, 1975, Milton T. Harmon, Juab
County Attorney, State of Utah, filed a petition for hearing

concerning the custody of the above entitled children,
requesting that custody of said children be vested in Mr.
and Mrs. Reuben Torn, their maternal grandparents.

This

matter carne on for hearing on April 15, 1975, and on July 15,
1975, before the Honorable H.L. Hermansen, who issued an
Order on August 22, 1975, depriving Appellants of the
temporary care, custody and control of the minor children
herein, and awarding the temporary care, custody, control
and guardianship of the children in question to one Delton
Torn.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek to have the Order of the
lower court vacated and the permanent care, custody and
control of the children in this matter awarded and restored
to Appellants.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The minor children herein were born to Eldon
and Donna May Pikyavit, husband and wife, who are now deceased.
Prior to their deaths, the Pikyavits lived on or near the
Moapa Indian Reservation at Moapa, Nevada.
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(Transcript "A" ,pp. 1, 7).

Sometime after the death of Mrs. Pikyavit,
Appellants Earl Baker, half brother to Eldon Pikyavit, and
his wife, Wallea Baker, were informed by relatives at the
Moapa Reservation that the minor Pikyavit children were
being passed from family to family and that they often
appeared hungry and unkempt.

(Transcript "A", p. 57).

Appellants were also informed that relatives of Mrs. Pikyavit
may have caused the death of her husband, which one of the
children claimed to have witnessed, and that the young child
feared that these relatives would kill him.
pp. 46-48).

(Record on Appeal,

After making inquiries, Appellants learned that

no person had been granted custody of the children by any
court.

(Transcript "A", p. 19),

(Record on Appeal, pp. 2, 3).

On or about October 10, 1974, Appellants
journeyed from their home at the Goshute Indian Reservation
in Utah, to the Moapa Reservation where Appellants located
two of the minor Pikyavit children, Darla Janae Pikyavit and
Everett Don Tom.
Utah.

Appellants transported the children to

(Transcript "A", p. 8).

The following day, Appellants

filed a Petition for custody of the children in the Second
District Juvenile Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
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alleging that the children were
legal guardian.

homeless and without a

That same day, the Honorable

JudgE~

L.W.

Garff, Jr. issued an Order granting Appellants temporary
custody of the children.

(Record on Appeal, pp. 1-4).

On

October 10, 1974, after discovering that Appellants had
transported the children to the State of Utah, Mrs. Reuben
Tom, maternal grandmother of the children, obtained an ex
parte order from the Judge of the tribal court at the Moapa
Indian Reservation, awarding her the temporary custody of·
the two children living with Appellants and Joel Reed Pikyavit.
(Transcript, pp. 8, 9).
On February 26, 1975, Milton T. Harmon,
Attorney for Juab County, filed a Petition in the Third
District Juvenile Court of Juab County, State of Utah,
requesting that the Court vest custody of the children in
Mr. and Mr. Reuben Tom, the maternal grandparents of the
children.

(Record on Appeal, pp. 41-43) (Mrs. Tom is now

deceased) .
Subsequently, Appellants moved to dismiss the
Petition onthe ground that the Petition failed to set forth any

-4-

facts which would confer jurisdiction on the Court pursuant
to Section 55-10-64(18), U.C.A., as amended, to alter the
Order giving Appellants custody of the children in favor of
Mr. and Mrs. Torn.

(Record on Appeal, pp. 44-45).

The Court

took Appellants' Motion under advisement and held a hearing
for custody determination on April 15, 1975.

(Transcript "A",

pp. 1-71).
At the initial hearing, the Juab County
Attorney, Milton T. Harmon, appeared in behalf of Mr. and
Mrs. Torn.

Over the objection of counsel for Appellant, the

County Attorney called witnesses who testified in favor of
custody being awarded to the Toms, cross-examined Appellants
and their witnesses, and testified informally to the Court as
to reasons why the Toms rather than Appellants should have
custody of the minor children.

(Transcript "A", pp. 4-71).

Appellants objected to the conduct of the County Attorney
on the ground that Section 55-10-64(18), U.C.A., as amended,
requires the County Attorney to participate in custody
determination as the representative of the State, and not as
the advocate and counsel of any private party seeking custody
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of the children in question.

The Court refused to rule on

Appellants' objections and permitted the County Attorney to
continue the course of conduct described throughout the
hearings

in this matter.

At the close of the initial

hearing, the Court ordered studies to be made of the Baker
home and the Tom home and continued the matter until July 15,
1975.

(Record on Appeal, pp. 56, 79-83).
On April 23, 1975, the County Attorney for

Juab County filed an Amended Petition for Custody, this
Petition alleging that the minor children were "dependent"
within the meaning of Section 55-10-64(18), U.C.A.

(1953),

as amended, because, according to Appellant Baker's testimony
at the first hearing, the children were being supported by
federal welfare payments.
(Transcript "A", p. 30).

(Record on Appeal, pp. 83-86)
On April 29, 1975, Appellants filed

a Memorandum in Support of their Motion to Dismiss, asserting
that the fact that the children were being supported by federal
welfare funds did not make them "dependent" within the meaning
of Section 55-10-64 (18), U.C.A.

(1953).

(Record on Appeal,

p. 91).
On July 15, 1975, the Court held a second
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hearing in this matter.

At this hearing, Mr. Larry Echohawk

of Salt Lake City, Utah, also represented the Tom family.
(Transcript "B", p. 1).
At the close of the second hearing, counsel
for Appellants renewed their Motion to Dismiss for failure
of the Tom's to properly invoke the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court, and also moved the Court to grant a mistrial
on the ground of County Attorney Harmon's illegal and improper
participation in the matter as an express advocate for one
of the parties seeking custody of the children.
pp. 55-58).

(Transcriot
"A" I
.._

The Court denied Appellants' Motions and subse-

quently issued an Order depriving Appellants of the care and
custody of the minor children herein and awarding Delton and
Sandra Tom temporary custody of said children, which Order
Appellants seek to have vacated on appeal.
PP o 11 0 1 112 )

o
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(Record on Appeal,

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL
BASED UPON THE IMPROPER AND ILLEGAL
PARTICIPATION OF THE COUNTY ATTORNEY
IN THIS MATTER AS COUNSEL AND ADVOCATE
FOR PRIVATE PARTIES SEEKING CUSTODY
OF THE MINOR CHILDREN HEREIN.
Section 17-18-1(7), Utah Code Annotated,
(1953), as amended, provides that the County At·torney is a
"public" prosecutor, and in reference to proceedings in the
juvenile court, must:
At the request of the judge of
the juvenile court, appear in
juvenile court to represent the
interest of any child charged
with delinquency before said court,
and represent the State in any
proceeding before it where any
rights in the custody of the juvenile
are asserted by any third person,
and prosecute before said court
any person charged with contributing
to the delinquency, neglect or
dependency of a juvenile.
Section 55-10-96, U.C.A.

(1953), as amended, also provides

that in hearings before the juvenile court, "the County
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Attorney shall represent the State in any proceedings in a
children's case".
Clearly, the above cited statutes contemplate
that in so far as juvenile custody proceedings are concerned,
the County Attorney is not authorized to act as counsel or
advocate for any private party seeking custody of children
within the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court, but must act
solely as a representative of the State and "in the best
interest of the child".
In the instant case, Milton T. Harmon,
Juab County Attorney, filed a Petition in the Third District
Juvenile Court, requesting the Court to vest custody of the
children herein with Mr. and Mrs. Reuben Tom, the maternal
grandparents of the children.

Thi~

in spite of the fact that

Mr. Harmon was fully aware that the children were living
with Appellants at the time by virtue of an Order of the Second
District Juvenile Court giving Appellants the temporary custody
of said children, and prior to any hearing or home study
which would indicate the relative qualifications of Appellants
and those whom Mr. Harmon represented, to have custody of
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said children.

At the hearings in this matter, particularly

the initial hearing, County Attorney Harmon pleaded the case
for the Tom family, introduced witnesses to demonstrate that
the Toms were better suited

than the Appellants to have

custody of the children in question, and cross-examined
Appellants and Appellants' witnesses.
Appellants submit that it was highly improper
for the Court to permit the County Attorney to act as private
counsel for the Tom family in this custody proceeding.
Pursuant to Section 55-10-96, U.C.A.

(1953), as amended,

the juvenile court is required to notify parties to proceedings,
and the child (sic) , if old enough, that they have a right
to be represented by counsel at every stage of the proceedings,
to have the counsel of their choice, and to have counsel
appointed by the court if they are without sufficient funds
to obtain counsel.

The cited statute further empowers the

Court to appoint counsel without such request, if it deems
representation by counsel necessary to protect ·the interest
of the child or other parties.
In view of the fact that this case from the
outset involved a hotly contested "custody battle", Appellants
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contend that the Court shouldhaveappointed counsel to
represent the interest of the Tom family rather than to
permit Mr. Harmon to lend the prestige of his office to
private litigants and to derrogate from his statutorily
authorized role as the representative of the State.
In the recent case of Ira K. Hearn, Jr. v.
Utah Liquor Control Commission, No. 14267, filed March 25,
1976, this Court castigated the Attorney General for departing
from his statutorily defined duties pursuant to Section 32-132(6), U.C.A.

(1953), as amended, where the Attorney General's

office represented both a private person who appeared at a
public hearing in opposition to his removal as Director of
the Liquor Control Commission, and also represented the
Commission at the hearing.

Appellant submits that the County

Attorney in the instant case similarly departed from his
statutory duties and that it was error for the Court not
to grant Appellants' Motion for Mistrial on the basis of the
County Attorney's participation as counsel for private parties
seeking custody of the children herein.
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POINT II
NEITHER THE JUAB COUNTY ATTORNEY
NOR THOSE MEMBERS OF THE TOM FAMILY
REPRESENTED BY THE COUNTY ATTORNEY
POSSESSED STANDING PURSUANT TO
SECTION 55-10-108 I u. c .A. ( 1953) I
AS AMENDED, TO PETITION THE COURT
FOR A MODIFICATION OF THE DECREE
AWARDING TEMPORARY CUSTODY OF THE
MINOR CHILDREN HEREIN TO APPELLANTS.
Section 55-10-108, U.C.A (1953), as amended,
provides that
A parent, guardian or next friend
of a child whose legal custody has
been transferred by the court to an
individual, agency, or institution,
except the state industrial school,
may petition the Court for a restoration of custody or other modification
or revocation of the decree ....
The statute indicates that to have standing
petition the Juvenile Court for a restoration of custody or
other modification or revocation of a custody decree, the
person petitioning the Court must be a parent, guardian or next
friend of the child who has had custody of the child prior
to the time that the Court issued an Order vesting temporary
custody of the child in another individual.
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Presumably, this

"standing" requirement is imposed by the state legislature
to protect the child and the person or persons to whom his or
her custody has been entrusted, from disruption of the
custodial relationship by some individual who has no prior
custodial right in regard to the child.
Since neither the County Attorney nor
Delton Torn and Sandra Torn, the parties ultimately awarded
custody of the children herein, were parents, guardians or
next friends of the children in the sense that they had some
prior custodial right in regard to the children whose custody
had been "transferred" by the Court, they had no standing to
petition the Juvenile Court to deprive Appellants of the
temporary custody of the minor children herein, and to award
the custody of said children to the Torn family.
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POINT III
THE PETITION FILED BY THE JUAB
COUNTY ATTORNEY IN BEHALF OF THE
TOM FAMILY FAILS TO SET FORTH THE
FACTS NECESSARY TO INVOKE THE
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT TO
REVOKE THE ORDER GRANTING APPELLANTS
TEMPORARY CUSTODY OF THE MINOR
CHILDREN HEREIN.
Section 55-10-108, U.C.A.

(1953:), as amended,

provides that a petition may be made to the Court for restoration of custody or other modification or revocation of the
decree, on the ground that "a change of circumstances has
occurred which requires such modification or revocation in
the best interest of the child or the public".
further provides that once a

The Statute

"change in circumstances" is

alleged, the Court should make a preliminary investigation,
and dismiss the petition if it finds the alleged change in
circumstances, if proved, would not affect the decree.

If

the Court finds that a change in circumstances should be
reviewed, the statute authorizes the Court to hold a hearing
concerning the matter.
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In the instant case, neither the original
Petition nor the Amended Petition filed by the Juab County
Attorney on behalf of the Tom family, set forth any "change in
circumstances" alleged to warrant the Court in issuing an
order depriving Appellants of the temporary custody of the
minor children herein "in the best interests of the child".
In State in Interest of F
and P

, D

v. Dade, 14 U.2d 46, 376 P.2d 948(1962), this

Court held that
The drastic remedy of depriving
parents of the custody of children
in cases where there was delinquency,
dependency or neglect was to be
resorted to only in extreme cases
and when it was manifest that the
home itself could not or would not
correct the evils which existed.
In the instant case, two of the

~inor

Pikyavit children had lived with Appellants for nearly six
months atthe time original Petition seeking to deprive them of
custody was filed by the Juab County Attorney on behalf of the
Tom family.

Appellants had come to regard the minor children
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as their own and the children had become accustomed to a
stable, healthful, and continuing relationship with Appellants.
Neither the original Petition or the Amended Petition filed
herein asserted that these children were in any way "delinquent",
or "neglected" within the provisions of Section 55-10-77,
U.C.A.

(1953), as amended, by reason of Appellants' actions.
Although paragraph 5 of the Amended Petition

contains an allegation the minor children in Appellants'
custody were "dependent" for the reason that "said children
are being supported by public welfare from the State of Utah",
said allegation does not establish that said minor children
are "dependent" within the meaning of the jurisdictional
statute, even if the alleged fact is true.

Certainly, no one

would contend that any of the numerous parents in this country
who are forced to maintain their children on welfare payments
from the State or federal government might lawfully be deprived
of their children for that reason alone, simply because a
more economically stable family wanted the children.

Yet this

seems to be the only reason set forth in the Petitions filed
herein, on the basis of which the Court was asked to deprive
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Appellants of the custody of two of the minor children herein
and to transfer the custody of said children to the Tom
family.

Thus, Appellants contend that the Court erred in

assuming jurisdiction to hear the Petitions filed herein
where they failed to set forth any "change in circumstance"
pursuant to Section 55-10-108, U.C.A.

(1953), as amended,

that would give the Juvenile Court jurisdiction to revoke
or modify the decree granting Appellants custody of the two
minor children herein.
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing points and authorities,
Appellants contend that the Juvenile Court was without
jurisdiction to issue the Order of August 22, 1975, depriving
Appellants of the temporary care and custody of two of the minor
children herein, and that the Court erred in not granting
Appellants' Motion for a mistrial based upon the improper
and illegal participation of the Juab County Attorney as
counsel for private parties in this action, entitling Appellants
to have the Order of the lower court vacated, and the custody
of at least two of the minor children herein restored to
Appellants.
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